

more to undermine our sense of common responsibility than our failed welfare system."

In just a few weeks, President Clinton will deliver another State of the Union Address.

And he will do so with the knowledge that he bears total responsibility for the continuation of that failed welfare system.

America heard a great deal of rhetoric in 1992 from candidate Clinton, and a great deal of rhetoric since then from President Clinton about "ending welfare as we know it."

But all the words in the world cannot obscure President Clinton's action of last night.

Given his promises, it is no wonder President Clinton used the cover of darkness to veto the truly revolutionary welfare reform bill which would have kept his commitments.

This bill was, of course, the result of almost a year of hard work by a bipartisan group of Members of Congress, Senators, and, very importantly, our Nation's Governors.

The President may have tried to hide his stealth veto by doing it late at night, but he can not hid the message he is sending to the American people: a loud and clear message that he will stand in the way of fundamental change, and, instead, will fight for the status quo.

The President's veto means that American taxpayers will enter 1996 continuing to pour countless millions into a system that has failed, according to everyone. The system failed, and failed, and failed. And those who are served by the system will enter a new year with little or no hope for escaping from a future of welfare.

What a different 1996—and a different future—it would have been had the President backed his words up with action by signing the legislation.

Instead of the status quo where all authority resides in Washington, we would have shifted power to our State capitals, and given our Governors the ability to create a system that meets the unique needs of their States.

Instead of the status quo, where welfare often becomes a way of life, and where some receive Federal; cash benefits just because they choose not to work, we would have a system where people are required to work after 2 years, and one with a 5-year limit on the receipt of Federal benefits.

Instead of the status quo, where children are rewarded for having children and for moving away from home, we would have one which recognizes the importance of family—one that discourages illegitimacy, and encourages personal responsibility.

Instead of the status quo, which often allows deadbeat dads to escape their financial responsibilities, we would have a system that streamlined paternity establishment, that established State registries, that made child support laws uniform across State lines, and that required States to use

the threats of denying drivers licenses to parents who refuse to pay child support.

Instead of the status quo which wastes billions of taxpayer dollars, we would have a system that gives our States the authority and responsibility to crack down on fraud and abuse.

I am not claiming that our welfare reform legislation was perfect. Nor would it have magically solved our Nation's many social problems.

But it did put an end to a failed system.

It was a sharp departure. It was a fundamental change.

It was a big, big, step in the right direction.

It did return power to our States and cities, and to our people.

It did offer hope and opportunity to millions of Americans.

And we did want to stress work, and not welfare.

But instead of beginning in 1996 by signing this legislation, the President has chosen to begin it by keeping the status quo intact.

I suspect that in this year's State of the Union Address, the President will again talk about how he wants to end welfare as we know it.

But they are words that will sound very hollow to many in this Chamber, and to all Americans who pay for, or who are served by, the status quo: And that is a failed system that remains intact thanks to the President's actions of last evening.

It seems to me that here is a bill that passed the U.S. Senate by a vote of 87 to 12. If one absentee, Senator HATFIELD, had voted "aye," it would have been 88 Senators—good, bipartisan, strong bipartisan support.

The bill went to conference, and we came back with a fundamental Senate bill. And by then it had become politicized again, and it was more of a party-line vote, with one exception on the other side.

We have discussed welfare reform in all of the meetings we have had at the White House. But I do not see how the President could veto a bill that we were so close to coming together on, one that he praised when it passed the Senate, one that he said he can support. I must say, if there are any sharp differences in those two bills—our bill and the bill that came from conference—they were not major.

So we will try again. We will try again in 1996. It seems to me, and it seems to most of my colleagues—at least the 87 who voted for welfare reform—that system has failed. We need fundamental change.

We are willing to trust the Governors. We are willing to send power back to States. Therein lies the problem. Therein lies the problem, because I do not think the President of the United States wants that to happen, unless the Federal Government determines eligibility and determines who is going to be covered and everything else. If you put all those regulations on

Governors, they will say, "No, thank you. If you don't give us flexibility, we can't save the money."

We are talking about saving somewhere in the neighborhood of \$60 billion over 7 years. And \$60 billion is a lot of money to the American taxpayers. We believe it can be done. We believe it can be done, and we can still preserve the benefits for those who need the benefits.

There will always be some who need help, and we understand that. But we will also tighten up the system so those who should be working will be working, and the alternative will not be receiving benefits.

So we regret that the bill has been vetoed. I guess you can say it came as no surprise. But in our view we had a good product that should have been signed. It seems to me that we will have to take our case to the American people and let them make the final decision.

PROVIDING FOR A CONDITIONAL ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 133, calling for an adjournment of both Houses of Congress until January 22, that the concurrent resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MURKOWSKI). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 133) was agreed to, as follows:

H. CON. RES. 133

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That when the House adjourns on the calendar day of Tuesday, January 9, 1996, it stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Monday, January 22, 1996, or until noon on the second day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the Senate recesses or adjourns on the calendar day of Wednesday, January 10, 1996, pursuant to a motion offered by the Majority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or adjourned until noon on Monday, January 22, 1996, or until noon on the second day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.

SEC. 2. The Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of the House and the Minority Leader of the Senate, shall notify the Members of the House and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.

EXPECTATION OF VOTES

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me say that I am pleased with the majority leader's remarks about the expectations for votes for the next couple of weeks. In case Senators are not clear, as I understand it, unless some significant unforeseen development arises, we